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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BION TOLMAN and LUCILLE TOLMAN, his wife; KARL J. HAWKINS,
JR. and MIRIAM HAWKINS, his wife;
BRUCE B. ANDERSON and DOROTHY
O. ANDERSON, his wife; K. JAY
HOLDSWORTH and DONA S. HOLDSWORTH, his wife; and EMERSON KENNINGTON and AUDRIE M. KENNINGTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY; OSCAR HANSON, JR., PHILIP BLOMQUIST and
MARVIN G. JENSON, Individually and
as Members of the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County; RALPH
Y. McCLURE, County Zoning Administrator; and LANE RONNOW, Director
of Building Inspection Department of Salt
Lake County,
Defendants-Respondents,
vs.
BILL RODERICK, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.

Case No.
10935

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In view of the failure of defendants and intervenor

to understand the posture of this case and the failure of
defendants and intervenor accurately to state the facts,
plaintiffs believe it to be necessary to submit this reply
brief.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
IN THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE BEFORE
JUDGE ELTON, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

Plaintiffs had assumed that defendants, intervenor
and the lower court understood the posture of this case.
But the tenor of intervenor's brief, 1 leads plaintiffs to
conclude that intervenor and defendants missed the point
of what was at issue before the lower court.
The matter came before the lower court on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. This was the
only matter at issue at the hearing before the lower
court. No trial was had on the substantive issues raised
in plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs have never been given
an opportunity to take depositions, make other discovery
or undertake other preparations for trial.2 All the lower
court heard was plaintiffs' motion for an injunction

pendente lite.
The hearing judge ruled against plaintiffs, but instead of merely denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and permitting plaintiffs to proceed to
trial, the lower court dismissed plaintiffs' entire com- ,
plaint. Dismissing the complaint at this point of the
proceedings was clearly wrong. 3
1Defendants' brief copies intervenor's brief with only a few
changes in wording.
. _
2Plaintiffs were under the stress of a temporary restrammg or~er
which allows only 10 days to prepare for the hearing on the motion
for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs had t~ proceed a~ once. and do
the best they could to obtain and prese_n~ evidence dunng this short
period; otherwise the temporary restrammg order would have been
dissolved.
Ii
auniess it is clear that plaintiffs 8re entitled to pr~vail, an a~p ·
cation for a preliminary injunction does no! inv?lve a fmal de~~Jlll·
tion on the merits. The purpose of an in1unct10n pendente lite 1~~
prevent a threatened wr~ng, or the doii:ig o! any act pending the. fi he
determination of the act10n and to mamtam the status quo until t
issues can be determined after a full hearing.
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There is a second reason why dismissal of the complaint was not proper. At the time of the hearing neither
intervenor nor defendants had made any motion to dismiss. A dismissal of the complaint when no motion to
dismiss had been made is clearly erroneous because it
deprives plaintiffs of "a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet" the issue of dismissal. 1 Plaintiffs could not defend
against a dismissal of its entire case when it was unaware that such action was being considered. 2
1 Remington Rand Inc. u. O'Neil, 4 Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416
(1956) and 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 369 (1957). Had plaintiffs been
aware that the hearing judge was contemplating a dismissal of the
complaint so that plaintiffs would not later have an opportunity at
the trial to present all its evidence on the issue of spot zoning, plaintiffs would have put on its expert witnesses and others t.o show how
insignificant would be the gain to the public, how extensive would be
the damage to this solid residential area and to the flow of traffic
through this intersection and how the proposed change of zoning has
no substantial relation t.o any legitimate object sought to be gained
through the exercise by Salt Lake County of its police power.

2Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "For failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal. . . . " No Utah
case decided under Rule 4l(b) has allowed a court to enter a dismissal sua sponte. Rule 4l(b) is based on§ 104-29-1(3) and (5) Utah
Code 1943 (see compiler's note to Rule 41 (b)) which provided "an
action may be dismissed ... (3) by the court when the plaintiff fails
to appear and the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal . . .
[or] (5) by the court upon motion of the defendant when upon the
trial plaintiff fails . . . ." [Emphasis added] A long line of cases
decided under § 104-29-1 make it clear that the grounds for a motion
for dismissal must be stated, in order that the attention of the court
and counsel may be called thereto and so that plaintiff may remedy
any defects in his case which admit of correction. Graham u. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P.2d 465 (1931); Smalley u.
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311 (1908). Because
the dismissal by the court sua sponte deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to correct any defects in their case, it is clearly improper
under the above cases.
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The initial thrust of plaintiffs' appeal is, therefore,
to obtain a reversal of the dismissal of the complaint
and to have the complaint reinstated.
Each of the points urged by plaintiffs below to persuade the judge to grant the motion for preliminary injunction and each of the points argued in plaintiffs' brief
is also relevant to show that plaintiffs' complaint is sufficiently meritorious to enable plaintiffs to stay in court
and proceed to trial. Even if the issue of dismissal had
been properly raised below, this Court unequivocably has
held that citizen-owners of property affected by a purported change of zoning are entitled to have redress to
the courts and may proceed to trial. This is the holding
of this Court in its recent decision in the first Naylor 1
appeal, and is controlling on this point.
On the issue of error in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, the evidence adduced at the hearing before the
lower court on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the evidence attempted to be introduced, and the
pleadings, together with every logical inference which
may be fairly drawn therefrom, must be viewed in that
light most favorable to plaintiff s. 2 This is not a case
where plaintiffs have been to trial and, despite what
intervenor and defendants assert on brief, neither intervenor nor defendants has an edge if there be conflicting
evidence supporting the findings of the lower court.
1Naylar v. Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d '!I
(1965).

zMartin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952); Clark v.
City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961).
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II.
THE POSTURE ON APPEAL OF THE LOWER
COURT'S ERROR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING THE TRIAL PERMITS ALL POINTS TO BE
URGED.

A second thrust of plaintiffs' appeal is that the
lower court erred in not granting plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction pending the trial. Plaintiffs
are entitled to prevail on this motion if any of the following is as alleged :
(a) Defendants' acts are illegal because they
failed to follow statutory and other procedures required by law to give affected property owners a
fair opportunity to be heard; or
(b) Defendants' acts are unconstitutional because they have deprived dwelling owners of their
constitutional protections; or
( c) The purported zoning change is illegal and
invalid for any other clear reason, such as:
(1) Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously
refused to perm.it dwelling owners to be heard
in response to their written petition presented
January 10, 1967; or
(2) The purported change of zoning by defendants is void because it otherwise arbitrarily
and capriciously infringes upon the rights of
dwelling owners; or
(3) The purported change of zoning by defendants is void because it is unjustly discriminatory in that it constitutes indiscriminate spot
zoning; or

6
( 4) The purported change of zoning by defendants is void because it unreasonably deviates from the newly adopted Master Plan and
the existing comprehensive zoning map.
On the motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs urged that the evidence adduced at the hearing
showed each of these reasons clearly. And plaintiffs
have so argued on brief and still so urge.
Intervenor's and defendants' assertion that the issue
of invalidity of the zoning change because of arbitrary
and capricious action by defendants was not raised before the lower court is not true; the point was pleaded,
and argued before the hearing judge.
Plaintiffs believe that of all issues pleaded, their
showing was clearer on the points of lack of notice and
the deprivation of constitutional protections. But if this
Court does not hold with plaintiffs on these arguments,
plaintiffs urge that nevertheless a sufficient showing
has been made on other points for this Court to reverse
the decision below and grant plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction. On appeal plaintiffs are not
foreclosed from urging any one or all issues because
they gave greater emphasis below to one issue over the
other issues pleaded.
The change of zoning is invalid if it clearly appears
to be beyond the power of the Commission; or is unconstitutional as it deprives one of property without due
process of law, or capriciously and abritrarily infringes
1
upon his rights therein, or is unjnstly discriminatory.
1Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633,
636 (1961).
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The subject change of zoning appears on its face
to be indiscriminate spot zoning1 and an unreasonable
deviation from the Master Plan 2 and the comprehensive
zoning map and clearly in excess of the police power. 3
That there must be some reason to support a change of
zoning is the clear holding of this Court in the second

,·

1 This Court has condemned indiscriminate spot zoning. Marshall
v. Salt Lffke County, 105 Utah 111, ~41 P.2d 704, 709 (1943).
2Until 1965 Salt Lake County did not have a Master Plan. Prior
to the Master Plan the land-use development of Salt Lake County
was a hodgepodge, almost as chaotic as though no zoning ordinance
had been adopted at all. What the Master Plan does is to adopt
general concepts of how planning of land uses in Salt Lake County will
proceed during the next generation (Ex. D-42, p. 1). Defendants
adopted the Master Plan and put at rest matters which otherwise
might be debatable, including the following:

(i) Scattered, mixed development throughout Salt Lake Valley is not to be permitted; instead commercial development is to
be clustered around a major metropolitan center with related
subcenters for local shopping such as the Cottonwood Mall (Ex.
D-42, pp. 20, 21);
(ii) Community and neighborhood shopping centers are to
be from three to ten acres, with their design and location appropriate to this function (Ex. D-42, p. 31) (no new commercial
area of smaller size is permitted by the plan);
(iii) "Strip" zoning and "spot" zoning is not to be permitted and residential areas are to be preserved free from intrusions of commercial development;
(iv) Points of conflict are to be avoided between commercial
development and a comprehensive network of expressways and
major arterials for movement of rapid vehicular traffic (Ex.
D-42, p. 28).

This is not a case - as it would have been had it arisen before 1965
- where the matter of a change of the zoning map was undertaken
without direction of the Master Plan. In the instant case, one of
the first to arise under the Master Plan, defendants ignore the ~lan
and violate its fundamental concepts. The Master Plan has meaning.
Concepts embraced by defendants when they adopted the Master
Plan have substance to them. Citizens are expected to tum to the
Master Plan for answers to questions about the County's future (Ex.
D-42, p. 55). The Master Plan cann?t be alterec:J. unless there is some
legally sufficient reason which benefits the public generally. No such
reason exists here.
3The Board of Salt Lake Count)'. ~mmis~ione~ does not have
power to make any zoning change which it desires without regard to
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Naylor appeal. 1 Otherwise there is no "foundational reason" for the zoning. 2 The principal reason usually rewhether the change has a substantial relation to a legitimate objective
to be ac~mplishec;l 1?Y its police power. Its power to make zoning
~h8:11ges IS not unlimit~d. \V_hen ~ change of zoning will have an in·
Jlln?US. effect on. a solid residential area, _it can be done at all only
if Wl~hin the_pohce power of the County, i.e., the gain to the general
public outweighs the damage to the value of dwellings in the area.
Authorities cited by intervenor and defendants on this issue are
not in poi~t. Parki~on v: Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291, P.~d 400 (1955)
(p. 28 of mtervenor s bnef and p. 27 of defendants bnef) is not a
zoning case, nor does it involve a county commission; it involved a
reapportiorunent statute.
Shaffner v. City of Salem, 201 Ore. 45, 268 P.2d 599 (1954) was
not a "spot zoning" case, and was so recognized as not a "spot zoning"
case by the Oregon Supreme Court. That case involved a change of
zoning for a service station in an area which was already essentially
commercial in nature. Eighty feet south of the proposed station was
a substantial business building occupied by an insurance firm. A build·
ing occupied by an ice cream store was 256 feet to the south. Near
the subject area was another service station, a grocery store and a
meat market. The Oregon Court was clear that the change of zoning
in that case would have been condemned had it been a "commercial
island" in a residential area. Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d
280 (1946) so holds.
The quotation from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations used
by intervenor and defendants and which according to them was the
basis for the holding in Shaffner is only part of the full text. What
intervenor and defendants did not include in brief was the other
quotation from McQuillin approved by the Oregon Court:
The constitutionality and validity of zoning depend essentially
upon a reasonable balancing of public interest in zo~ng as against
opposing private interests in property. * * * That IS to say, the
theory is to foster improvements by confining certain classes of
buildings and uses to certain localities without imposing undue
hardship on property owners. * * *
On the one hand the detriment to public welfare that would
result if zoning restrictions were removed must be weighed against
benefit that would accrue to individual property owners. On !he
other hand in determining the reasonableness of the assertion
of public i~terest thr~mgh ~oning against. private personal and
property rights, cons1deratio.n .ID:ust be given_ to the .e":tent to
which property values are d1rmmshed by zorung restrictions, to
the character of the neighborhood, and to the use being made
of nearby property, and if 1J:ie gain to the public is small when
compared with the hardship rmposed upon property owners t~en
no valid basis for exercise of the police power through zomng
exits [sic]. * * *
1Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 306, 410 P.2d 764
(1966).
2[bid.
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quired to support a change of zoning is that the change
will benefit the public. No such reason has or can be
advanced by defendants or by intervenor in this case. 1
1
There is . no basis fo~ concluding that any of the supporting
reasons found m Naylor exist here. There is no showing of a gradual
expansion of business and commercial usage of property outward from
downt:own Holladay ?r fr?m .the. Cottonw_ood _Mall or from any other
establish~ commercial district In the direction of this area. There
is no showmg of congestion or deterioration of residences the removal
of which may tend to alleviate health hazards or decre~se the crime
rate, particularly among juveniles in that locality. There is no showing that the proposed use would constitute a buffer zone between
residential and commercial and business areas.
Conf~~g a private e<;:<>nomic benefi~ on interv~nor is obviously
not~ _sufficient reason. An u:icrease of vehicular traffic is not a legally
sufficient reason because thIS would destroy the stability of zoning.
Deligtish v. Greenberg, 135 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1954); Page v. Portland,
178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946). Plaintiffs assert that no showing
could be made that the subject parcel of land could not be used for
any of the purposes authorized in a residential district. But such
a showing, even if made, would not be a legally sufficient reason.
Freeman v. Y o;nkers, 205 Misc. 947, 129 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1954). (Rezoning of a corner lot located in the midst of a residential district to commercial to permit the owners to establish a gas station thereon held
invalid, no other commercial use having been allowed in the area
and there being no reasonable ground for believing there would be
a need within the reasonable future for a gas station on the subject
corner in view of the presence of other stations in the area.)
The subject parcel is far too small to develop as a separate commercial area. It amounts to a little island of commercial use created
in an essentially different district. The Master Plan and comprehensive zoning ordinance would be worthless if the owner of each individual, small parcel of land could have the zoning changed to suit
his own inclinations. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687
(1951). Even if a showing were made of substantial growth of population, such condition is common to almost any populated area of the
United States and even if population growth might call for a change
in the Maste; Plan to be made from time to time, such a showing
could not justify a special regulation having no uniform application
which singles out this small parcel for private benefit to its owner.
Parker v. Rash, supra. A showing ~hat the proposed use of appli~~mt's
property would substantially contnbute to the general welfare IS not
a legally sufficient reason because in a sense eve!)'. lawfully c~nducted
enterprise contributes to the general welfare. Ibid: A showmg that
the subject property would have greater econo~~ value as commercial property does not constitute a legally sufficient reason. Pennin~ v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 _(1954); Paqe v. P'!rt~nd,
supra. An increase in traffic count on abutting str~ets is no_t m !~elf
sufficient justification for a zoning change to permit a gasolme filling
station. Ruskin v. North Lake, 55 Ill. App.2d 184, 204 N.E.2d 200
(1964). To the same effect is the indistinguishable case of Clark v.
City of Boulder 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961).
Even if it had been established that there has been teenage love
making on the site, s~ch an occurrence at most. would be a mere
nuisance which would nnpose on the landowner (mtervenor) a duty
to abate. Intervenor cannot breach i~ du~y. to aha~ a nuisance and
thereby establish a reason for a gasolme fillmg station.
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Plaintiffs urge that this change of zoning is so flagrantly wrong that defendants cannot show a legally sufficient reason to support it and this ground alone is
sufficient reason to grant the motion for preliminary
injunction. 1 This is the thrust of the material included
under Point V of plaintiffs' brief entitled "Defendant
Commissioners' Actions Were Arbitrary and Capricious."
Having clarified the posture of the issues before
this Court on appeal, plaintiffs will correct the erroneous
statements of fact made on brief as well as respond to
new matters raised on brief by intervenor and defendants relating to the issues of the lack of a fair opportunity to be heard and deprivation of constitutional protections. The purposes of this part of plaintiffs' reply
will be to demonstrate the error in denying plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction and the error in dismissing the complaint.
III.
THE FACTS ARE NOT AS STATED BY INTERVENOR AND DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO
THE INVALIDITY OF THE ACTION OF DEFENDANTS BECAUSE OF HAVING PRECLUDED AFFECTED PROPERTY OWNERS FROM HA YING A
FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON DECEMBER 28, 1966.

In asserting the sufficiency of the so-called notice
given of the so-called hearing before the Salt Lake
icwrk v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 ,P.2d 160 (1!!61) is
a case which is factually and procedurally a car.hon copy. of the rnstant
case on all issues other than the lack of notice. quest10n. f'.ropertY
improperly rezoned was the su~ject of a 1!1-0~10n f?r. pre~mmary
injunction. The lower court demed the prelumnary m1unct10n and
dismissed plaintiff's complaint. On appeal the Colorado Supreme
Court not only reversed but granted relief to plaintiffs.
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County Commission on December 28, 1966, both intervenor and defendants have neither fully nor accurately
stated the facts; further, they have relied on assertions
of fact not proved. Plaintiffs will complete and clarify
the facts relevant to this issue.
Intervenor makes the flat assertion that "two Mormon Bishops" attended the hearing before the Planning
Commission (on this particular change of zoning) and
as "representatives" of the people in the area advised
them of the application for a change of zoning. Intervenor relies heavily on this in argument. Defendants
make substantially the same assertions. There is nothing
in the record to support such statements; each is untrue.
One "Mormon" Bishop (Baird) and a former "Mormon" Bishop (Wallin) were witnesses at the hearing
before Judge Elton. Wallin was not present at any
Planning Commission meeting which considered the application of intervenor; he knew nothing about any proposed change of zoning until he learned the last of
December (1966) or the first of January (1967) that the
former County Commission had changed the zoning (R.
131). Any implication by intervenor that Wallin was
present at an administrative hearing and informed the
members of his ward about anything is not only untrue
but unfair. 1
'Bishop Birrell of the Hollad~y El~venth ~ard (the transcript
says Bishop Morrell, R 9~) _was with. BIS~op ~rurd at ~h~ N~vem~r
18, 1966, Planning Com.rmss1on m~eti,1;1g gettmg perm~ss10n _on a
little Holladay Eleventh Ward Project (R. 96). ~here IS no ev1de~ce
at all that Bishop Birrell acted Ill'! a representative ~f any d~elli_ng
owner in connection with the subject property or discussed it with
anyone. Geographically, the boundaries of the Holladay Eleventh
Ward are not close to the subject property.
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The other witness, Baird, is Bishop of Holladay
Third Ward in which geographic area the subject property is situate. Rather than being of help to intervenor
and defendants, evidence supplied by Baird is far more
helpful to plaintiffs, because it shows how defendants
first created a deceptive situation, which caused the
dwelling owners to let down their guard, and then how
they permitted this deceptive situation to continue uncorrected. We review the evidence.
During late summer of 1966 plaintiff Audrie Kennington and Baird heard rumors about a change of zoning on the subject property and did what alert citizens
should have done - they inquired personally of the
Planning Director, defendant McClure, about how dwelling owners could protect their rights. Baird and Mrs.
Kennington made a personal visit to McClure in his
office in August, 1966 (R. 93). Baird also phoned McClure a few times asking about it (R. 96). Here is the
start of the deceptive situation created by defendants.
McClure indicated to Baird and to Mrs. Kennington "that
we probably would hear more about this as time went
on" (R. 95). Baird was told by McClure that to process
a change of zoning application he (McClure) needed the
names of property owners near the subject property (R.
95). The only possible significance of such a statement
by McClure, in the context of the inquiry by Baird, was
that adjoining property owners would be informed about
any hearing which affected their rights. McClure per·
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mitted the inquiring dwelling owners to believe that the
need for the names of property owners was for notifying
them that something was happening in their area (R.
95). Even though dwelling owners made these inquiries,
no one on behalf of defendants told any dwelling owner
that the matter would be considered by the Planning
Commission on November 18, 1966. Baird, an architect
by profession, happened to have a matter for the Holladay Eleventh Ward which was to be considered before
the Planning Commission on November 18, 1966. It was
at this time that he heard the Planning Commission deny
intervenor's application. Even though defendants knew
Baird and Mrs. Kennington were interested in the change
of zoning on the subject property, no one on behalf of
defendants told Baird on November 18, 1966, or thereafter, that the application of intervenor denied by the
Planning Commission might be appealed to the Salt Lake
County Commission (R. 96). Nor was he informed that
a further hearing might be held by the County Commission at which he or other dwelling owners might
appear in opposition and that the County Commission
might reverse. Instead Baird was led to believe that the
granting of the application was unlikely. Both intervenor and defendant concede on brief that Baird thought
approval of the application was unlikely. He would not
have thought so unless led so to believe by defendants.
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Had it been done deliberately, 1 nothing could have
been better calculated to get Baird to "drop his guard"
and to mislead him into thinking that the action of the
Planning Commission was final and that he need not
be concerned about any further proceedings. Thereafter
defendants did nothing to set Baird straight. When
intervenor appealed to the County Commission, defendants knew about it but neither Baird nor Mrs. Kennington knew about it. McClure knew the constructive nature
of the notice procedures which he had been directed
to follow (which would not really warn dwelling owners
in the area) and he knew or should have known that
Baird and Mrs. Kennington might not learn about the
date and time of the hearing scheduled for December
28, 1966, because he had theretofore received complaints
from other property owners about the ineffectiveness
of the "notice" procedures used by the County (R. 160).
1 Plaintiffs do not necessarily contend that defendants created the
deceptive situation intentionally. Plaintiffs have no reason to sup·
pose that a professional planner (not an elected politician), such as
McClure, would have any objective other than to do what was for
the best for the citizens of Salt Lake County. McClure could not
expect on November 18, 1966, that the lame-duck out-going Cowity
Com.mission would conduct a "present-for-everyone party" three days
after Christmas and pass a "Christmas-tree" ordinance granting every
application that had been arranged to be before it on that day. Nor
could McClure expect on November 18, 1966, that this County Com·
mission would be so calloused as to ignore completely the unanimous
recommendation against the change of zoning by its own zoning
staff (of which McClure was a member) and by the Planning Com·
mission and thereby violate the fundamental concepts of the Master
Plan (which the County Commissio~ had so _recently adoJ:?ted) ~y
creating this small spot of commerCJ.al zone m an otherwISe solid
area of "real valuable" residences.

But whether done inadvertently or otherwise, defendants did
create the deceptive situation and permitted it to exist uncorrected
until after the December 28, 1966, "hearing" had been completed.
It was then "too late."
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But neither McClure nor anyone else on behalf of defendants told Baird that a further proceeding was being
und0rtaken, or that another hearing would be held before
the County Commissioners who might reverse. Defendants permitted this deceptive situation to continue. 1 Defendants had a duty to speak and inform Baird of this
danger. Defendants also had a duty to warn Mrs. Kennington. Defendants failed to do either. The unfairness
of defendants' conduct is emphasized by McClure's sending to applicant a letter advising it of the time of the
Salt Lake County Commission meeting to be held December 28, 1966. But why no letter from McClure to
Baird or to Mrs. Kennington 1 Defendants knew these
dwelling owners were interested and wanted to appear
m opposition.
A similar deceptive situation was created when
McClure told plaintiff Audrie Kennington to watch for
red-lettered signs to be tacked to utility poles near the
property. Because of her inquiry, defendants knew that
::>he was interested in any proposed change of zoning on
this property. But no one on behalf of defendants informed Mrs. Kennington that there ·would be a hearing
on the application of intervenor before the County ComlThere is no evidence that anyone on behalf of defendants
informed Dr. Clark Hall or any other member of the Holladay District Planning Commission of a further hearing before the County
Commission. Defendants could not reasonably expect Dr. Hall or
any other member of the Holladay District Planning ~m.rn!ssi?n
to inform or warn the residents in the Holladay Planrung Distnct
that there would be a further hearing on December. 28, 1966, _wh~n
defendants had not even told any member of their own D1stnct
Planning Commission about the further proceeding._ In this ,bac;kground defendants will not be heard to blame their ow~ DIStnct
Planrui;.g Commission for not warning residents of the distnct.
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mission on December 28, 1966, which would affect her
rights. What more can a citizen do than make a personal
inquiry of the County official responsible for change of
zoning matters, follow his directions and search diligently
on utility poles for paper notices that were no longe~
theret 1
At the so-called hearing on December 28, 1966, the
lame-duck County Commissioners may not have known
that there were dwelling owners within the area of the
subject property who wanted to object, but defendant
McClure knew, and thereby his principals knew. When
applicant had completed its presentation before the
County Commission on December 28, 1966, and no one
appeared in opposition, it was McClure's duty to speak
and to inform the Commissioners in substance that he
knew of opposition to the change of zoning and specifically that he had talked to Mrs. Kennington and Baird,
each of whom had expressed to him their desire to appear in opposition. These known dwelling owners were
thereby deprived of a fair opportunity for a hearing.
Defendants may not be heard to assert as they have
on brief, that this case should be controlled by archaic
rules permitting constructive notice where interested
tAudrie Kennington was watching the very pole near the inter·
section of 4500 South and 2300 East (where the paper sign was sup·
posed to have remained) to see when the notice was placed there
(R 20) It did not stay there long enough for her to see it. To
make ~atters worse even though McClure told Mrs. Kennington
that she would see ~ paper sign on utility poles near the property
specifying the time and place of the "hearing," neither McClure nor
anyone on behalf of defendants ever ascertained whether the paper
signs remained on the poles long enough for her to see them, . or
whether she in fact saw them and thereby knew when the heanng
was to be.
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:persons are unknown. Defendants knew who these two
dwelling owners were and that they were interested and defendants knew that many dwelling owners residing within the geographic boundaries of Holladay Third
Ward, of which Baird was Bishop, also were interested.
This is a case of wholly inadequate constructive
notice procedures - a type of notice which in plain fact
is a fiction, 1 and incompatible with the ease of modern
conununication. But this case is much more. This is a
case where defendants created a deceptive situation with
respect to individual homeowners who defendants knew
were trying to protect their rights. The unbending refusal of defendants, who perpetuated the wrong in the
first place, to permit these persons to be heard is so
patently unfair and wrong that this Conrt should reverse
the lower court on general principles of fair play 2 and
without ever reaching the issue whether constitlltional
due process was violated. 3
1 Defendants and intervenor cite in support of their position the
1876 case of Graham v. Fitz, 53 Miss. 307. Times have changed since
1876; methods of communication have become much more direct, and
citizens today are entitled to be informed by their elected public
officials, whose compensation they pay with their taxes. In addition,
Graham v. Fitz, supra, is out of point because it was a case of a
trustee's sale where it could not possibly be known who the prospective buyers might be.

ZThis Court has already decided this issue in favor of plaintiffs,
when persons to be affected are krwwn. In Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76
Utah 575, 290 Pac. 950 (1930) (page. 28 C?f plain~iffs' brief) this Co~
reversed a default judgment in a qmet_ title a~on where ~e movmg
party relied solely on constructive notice to mform a claimant who
was in possession.
3This Court in Naisbitt v. Herrick, supra, indicated in dictum
that the constructive notice in that case did not measure. up to tl~e
state and federal requirements that one may not be depnved of his
property without due process of law.
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Defendants and intervenor try to argue that the
whole notice procedure of the County could be thwarted
if surrounding property owners could toll the thirty
day "notice" period by tearing down the paper signs
from utility poles. The attempted argmnent does not
make sense. The law of this Court is clear that had
defendants written a letter, telephoned or otherwise informed the property owners within 150 feet of the sub.
ject property of the hearing and had such property owners appeared at the hearing and been heard, they could
not raise the question of lack of notice. 1 The easy way
to avoid any tolling would be for defendants to inform
property owners within 150 feet of the subject property,2
as well as to inform property owners who come to their
office and make personal inquiry. This would prevent
such property owners (who had actual notice) from raising an issue of notice and would make moot whether or
not the paper signs stayed on the utility poles. Naylor v.

Salt Lake City Corp., supra.
For defendants and intervenor to suggest inappropriate activity by persons who did not even know that
there was going to be a hearing is preposterous. As of
that moment when the pieces of paper were tacked on
the utility poles (November 26, 1966) who knew that
the pieces of paper were there~ ~rhere are only two
1Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 172 Utah 2d 306, 410 P.2d 764,
766 (1966).
.
2The existing procedure of defendants is that names and addressi;s
of these persons are to be supplied to defendants by ~pplicant:. 'l_'hJS
information is an integral part of every change of zorung appli_catio'.1·
No one has explained why this procedure was not f~llowed 1!1. ~his
case. The mailing of such notice need not be defendants respo_ns1b1mailht~.
Defendants could make an applicant for a change of zorung
notices to contiguous property owners.
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groups of persons - defendants and intervenor. There
is no evidence that any other person in the area or elsewhere then knew that the pieces of paper had been or
would be tacked to the utility poles.
Plaintiffs were not able to prove who or what tore
the paper signs off the utility poles. Plaintiffs proved
that the paper signs did not stay on the poles long
enough for anyone living in the area to see them. 1
The evidence supplied by plaintiffs that neither of
the paper signs stayed on the poles long enough to be
seen is not negative evidence (as intervenor and defendants imply). Plaintiffs produced positive evidence. Witness Wallin looked at the west face of the north pole
many times between Thanksgiving and Christmas and
saw thereon only the four corners (fragment remnants)
and the tacks, and "that is all" (R. 127). Witness Plumlee looked at the west face of the nol'th pole many times
during the same period and saw that nothing was on
1 Even though a friend of Bill Roderick's son (R. 63) who can
hardly be characterized as "uninterested" - testified he saw a paper
sign, he also testified the sign might have been on a pole at an intersection other than 2300 East and 4500 South (R. 64). This witness
merely drove by in an automobile; he did not get out of the automobile, nor walk to any utility pole nor read any sign. On the day
he said he saw the signs he was driving his own car and was proceeding south on 2300 East (R. 55). At the intersection he thought
he turned left (eastward) onto 4500 South (R. 60), so that the pole
was on his right (R. 61). He had no idea what day it was that he
saw the sign (R. 60). He did not kno:n where he was in ~h~ intersection when he looked (R. 61). He did not remember noticmg any
zoning signs until asked by Bill Roderick's son to be a wi~ess
(R. 63). Defendants' own witness Hardeman, who tacked the pie?IB
of paper to the utility poles, testified that he placed the paper sign
so high on the north utility pole that it could not be seen by a passing motorist (R. 177). A paper sign on the west face of the north
utility pole could not be easily seen by the driver of a south bo~d
car turning east onto 4500 South; the pole would be on the opposite
side of the car from the driver and the paper on the west face of
the pole would have been behind the witness as he proceeded east.
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the pole (R. 140). Witness Henrichsen, who was entirely
objective, testifying that he was "neither for it [the
change of zoning] nor against it," (R. 91) observed
"nothing" on either pole (R. 87) even though both poles
were next to his walkway from which he removed snow
(R. 87). 1 Witnesses Keller and Kennington similarly
supplied positive evidence that the paper signs were not
on the poles during this period.
Plaintiffs make a brief reply to the assertion by
both intervenor and defendants concerning other changeof-zoning applications which they allege would be affected by a decision in this case. There is nothing in
the record upon which defendants or intervenor can
base their assertion of the existence of 1200 other applications which could be affected by a decision in this
case. Plaintiffs do not believe that there exist 1200 other
applications having facts similar to this application. But
if that is not so, and if the situation is as defendants
and intervenor imply, i.e., that there are 1200 other situations where property owners have not been notified of
the "hearing," have been misled by County officials, and
have learned of the zoning change subsequent to the
"hearing" but have requested and been denied relief before the ordinance was placed into effect, then this Court
should put a stop to such unfair action by defendants
in destroying property values of hundreds of thousands
1Thls witness, above all the others, because he resides right next

to the subject property, would have seen one or the other of t?e paper

signs had they remained on the poles for very long after having been
affixed.
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of residents of Salt Lake County without an adequate
opportunity to be heard. 1
Plaintiffs reply to the position taken by defendants
and intervenor that plaintiffs and other property owners
in the area adjoining and near the subject property are
not entitled to the protection of the constitutional due
process rules as developed by the United States Supreme
Court.
Defendants and intervenors seem to be saying that
plaintiffs are not entitled to have the benefit of the rules
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Mullane, Schroeder and Walker,2 because the instant case is
not a condemnation case. Plaintiffs submit that the procedural due process rules apply to any governmental
proceeding where citizens are entitled to be heard. A
fair chance to learn about a proceeding affecting human
rights is fundamental to our constitutional society. It
doesn't have to be a condemnation case. This Court has
1
Two wrongs do not make a right. Two hundred forty thousand
wronged property owners in Salt Lake County do not make the conduct of defendants right. For decades, accused in criminal cases have
been deprived of their constitutional rights of counsel and of being
free from third degree methods to obtain confessions. The existence
of such procedures over the years is no justification for continued
abuses. During recent terms of the United States Supreme Court, such
time-honored procedures have been consistently condemned under
the due process protection of the Qonstitution of. th~ United. States.
In like manner the existence of widespread depnvation of nghts of
property owners in Salt Lake County, even if proved, ~ no justification for perpetuation of the status quo. It woul4 not be likely to deter
the United States Supreme Court from correcting such wrongs. Nor
should it deter this Court.

2Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); and Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
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held in Gayland that the constitutional protections
against deprivation of property without due process or
1

by unjust discrimination are available to affected property owners in change-of-zoning cases. 2
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction should
have been granted for one or all of the following reasons:
a. Defendants' acts are Hlegal because defendants have deprived dwelling owners of a fair opportunity to be heard;
b. Defendants' acts are unconstitutional because
defendants have deprived dwelling owners of their
constitutional protections; and
c. The purported change of zoning is illegal
and invalid in any event.
But if for some reason this Court does not hold
that the motion for preliminary injunction should have
been granted, the complaint nevertheless should be relGayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636
(1961).
2This Court also has determined that property rights might be
seriously affected by the enactment of a zoning ordinance and for
this reason the requirement for notice and a hearing may not be
treated lightly. Because of the potential detrimental effect of a zoning
change upon property rights the action of the legislative body becomes
quasi judicial in character and due process may not be dispensed with.
Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954)
quoting with approval from Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal.
134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929).
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instated and plaintiffs should be given an opportunity
to try the issues raised by the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
K. Jay Holdsworth
J. Randolph Ayre
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Appellants

